2015年ACCA考試《P4高級財務(wù)管理》知識輔導(dǎo)2

　　高頓網(wǎng)校小編為各位學(xué)員整理了ACCA考試P4科目的基礎(chǔ)講義輔導(dǎo)，希望能夠幫助大家更好地復(fù)習(xí)。
       EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (ECB)

　　As already mentioned the key problem is one of liquidity and hence the ECB has taken action in conjunction with the other leading central banks of the world in order to try and ensure that both governments and major banks have sufficient liquidity.

　　Specifically the ECB has bought both government and private debt securities in the open market, as by so doing it provides liquidity or cash to the government or organisation selling the debt securities.

　　As the crisis has progressed the ECB has accepted Greek Government bonds of any status as collateral for lending. These purchases are obviously politically motivated and not normal commercial transactions. As such they have effectively reduced the

　　independence of the ECB and unhappiness with this has prompted some high level resignations.

　　In conjunction with the EU, the IMF has made loans available. The IMF first became involved as a result of the inability of Europe to agree a solution to the emerging Greek crisis. Some countries are thought to have been keen for the IMF to become involved due to the reputation the IMF has for imposing stringent fiscal austerity measures. It is thought that nations may take more heed of measures imposed by the IMF than measures imposed by their European counterparts.

　　In early 2012, the IMF was seeking an extra $500bn for additional lending that it anticipates may be needed to assist countries with liquidity problems. This is a clear indication that in the IMFˇs view there is still much to be done.

　　As expected the extra lending which has been made has required the recipient countries to adopt stringent fiscal austerity measures. However, Christine Lagarde, the new head of the IMF has been critical of the emphasis there has been on austerity measures and has called for more measures to promote growth.

　　In the US, growth is being promoted through the d*uation of the dollar and other measures and there has been less emphasis on austerity measures. This is driven by the US fear of a 1930s style depression. In Germany, on the other hand, there is more enthusiasm for imposing austerity measures as there is a fear of inflation due to the hyperinflation Germany suffered between the two world wars. All nations are victims of their history. Ironically the economic woes of Germany between the two world wars were largely a result of the stringent measures imposed on Germany after the end of World War 1.

　　With regard to the Euro the most likely outcome at the current time is that the Euro continues in its present form with its existing members. However, this view could easily be overtaken by events even between the time I write this and the date of publication. For this to happen emergency funds will need to be provided when and where required and, if necessary, a managed default may occur in one or more countries. The popularity of this option is that by holding the Euro together the risk of contagion is minimised. However, the contagion feared if Greece is allowed to exit the Euro seems to be in danger of occurring anyway as witnessed by the sudden rise that occurred in Italian bond yields in late 2011. Furthermore countries at risk will be encouraged to promise much with regard to potential fiscal measures that may be imposed on them safe in the knowledge that no effective sanction will be taken against them when they fail to comply. This option seems to be a ˉletˇs muddle

　　through and see what happens approachˇ but does not necessarily seem sustainable in the long run. Furthermore, it is not necessarily the best approach for the countries involved as they will remain locked into a currency which fails to suit their needs.

　　In order to reduce the risk of further and ongoing crises, a closer fiscal union between Eurozone members is envisaged. This will involve more stringent fiscal rules and greater penalties for countries not abiding by the rules.

　　As Eurozone members have individually lost control of their interest rates, exchange rates and capital controls they need to adjust exports and/or consumption as otherwise the trade imbalances which threaten to undermine the Euro will continue. For example, Germany needs to promote domestic consumption while Greece needs to reduce consumption and promote exports. It will be a difficult task for Greece to achieve this whilst they remain in the Euro. Historically, a country in this position would carry out a currency d*uation to promote exports and growth.

　　The European Stability Mechanisation (ESM) is a permanent scheme which is due to take over from both the EFSF and EFSM from July 2012. It will act as a financial firewall and through guarantees, limit the potential for default by any one country and hence the risk of contagion.

　　With regard to the Euro two other options have been suggested:

　　The first option involves a Greek default and expulsion or departure from the Euro. Supporters of this feel that the contagion caused by a Greek default could be managed and this would help rebuild confidence in the remaining Eurozone. (Sacrificing the weakest member of the herd may just make the rest of the herd safer.) Equally, the remaining Eurozone countries would abide more rigorously to any fiscal rules imposed on them for fear of following the fate of Greece. While Greece would initially bear significant pain as a result of falling out of the Euro, there is a worry that after a few years other troubled countries, still struggling within the Euro, may see the Greek economy recovering and decide that they too will choose to leave thus causing the Euro project to effectively fail.

　　The second option which currently seems the least likely is that Germany leaves the Euro and introduces a new Deutschmark or enters into a new currency union with other Northern European nations with more closely aligned economies. This would leave the Euro to slump and find a new level which would meet the needs of the PIIGS and others.

　　At the present time the collapse of the Euro in its present form seems politically unacceptable and hence neither of the above options seems likely to occur. However, a Greek withdrawal or expulsion has at times seemed close and events could rapidly develop such that the currently favoured option becomes unsustainable.

　　Other suggestions that have arisen during the crisis but which have so far not been acted upon include:

　　The issue of Eurobonds or stability bonds has been much talked about. These bonds would be jointly issued and underwritten by all Eurozone countries as opposed to the current situation where each nation state issues and is responsible for their own debt. This approach is not favoured by Germany as it would effectively involve Germany taking on others liabilities.

　　A European Monetary Fund has been suggested. This fund would lend to governments at a cheap rate dependant on that nation abiding by certain fiscal rules. This would encourage fiscal responsibility as otherwise a nation would need to access the traditional and more costly commercial bond markets.